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Abstract
It is proved that Groves’ scheme is unique on restricted domains which
are smoothly connected, in particular convex domains. This generalizes
earlier uniqueness results by Green and Laﬀont and Walker. An example
shows that uniqueness may be lost if the domain is not smoothly connected.
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Introduction

In a classical paper Groves [7] introduced a scheme which induces individuals
to reveal true information about preferences for public decisions under the assumption that preferences are additively separable and linear in money. This
was done in the context of a game of incomplete information with partial communication. When full communication is feasible, Groves and Loeb [8] showed
that the same scheme makes true revelation of preferences a dominant strategy.1
Subsequently, Green and Laﬀont [5] proved that Groves’ scheme is unique in this
respect when a universal domain of preference proﬁles (or a domain containing
all continuous proﬁles) is allowed.
Since Green and Laﬀont’s proof rests crucially on the assumption of such
a large domain of proﬁles (cf. Walker [12]), it is conceivable that uniqueness
would be lost when the domain would be further restricted.2 The purpose of the
present paper is to investigate this issue. The main result (Theorem 1) states
that Groves’ scheme will be unique on any domain which is smoothly connected.
∗ I am indebted to Claude d’Aspremont, Takao Kobayashi, Jean-Jacques Laﬀont, JeanFrancois Mertens, Robert Wilson, and particularly Asad Zaman for discussions on this topic.
This paper was written while the author was a visitor at the Center for Operations Research
and Econometrics, Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.
1 Clarke

[4] had earlier proved this result for proﬁle domains which are one-dimensional.

2 Compare

with Arrow’s impossibility result in social choice theory, which is no longer valid
on restricted domains (Arrow [1]).
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A domain is smoothly connected if for any two preference proﬁles in the domain
there exists a diﬀerentiable deformation of one proﬁle into the other within the
domain (i.e., the domain is a diﬀerentiably homotopic class). An example shows
that, in general, smooth connectedness of the domain is indispensable for the
uniqueness result to hold.
An important class of domains which are smoothly connected is the class of
convex domains (Theorem 2). Thus, one may a priori take preferences to be
convex, diﬀerentiable, polynomial, etc., without altering the uniqueness result.
This generalizes substantially previous results by Green and Laﬀont [5, 6] and
Walker.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 recalls the basic problem structure, Section 3 contains the uniqueness results, and the ﬁnal section
contains some concluding remarks.
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Let D be a set of alternative public decisions containing at least two elements
and N = {1, ..., n} a set of n individuals or agents. Each agent i ∈ N possesses
a utility function ui (z, d) deﬁned over money z ∈ R and public decisions d ∈ D,
which is linearly additively separable in its arguments, so that we can write:
ui (z, d) = z + vi (d),

i ∈ N.

(1)

We call vi (d) agent i’s valuation function, and it is assumed to belong to a
prescribed set of valuation functions, Vi , called the domain or admissible set of
valuation functions for agent i.
The objective is to choose an eﬃcient public decision from D. If v =
(v1 , ..., vn ) ∈ V = ×ni=1 Vi are the true valuation functions of the agents, it
follows from (1) that an eﬃcient decision d∗ (v) ∈ D must satisfy:
d∗ (v) ∈ arg max
d∈D



vi (d).4

(2)

i∈N

We will always assume V and D are such that (2) is well-deﬁned for all v ∈ V .5
Only agent i knows his own valuation function. Hence, decisions must be
made based on what he reports about this valuation function. In a direct revelation mechanism each agent is asked to report his true valuation function
and subsequently a public decision is made according to a decision rule satisfying (2). In order to achieve eﬃcient decisions in this way, agents must
be induced to tell the truth. This may be done by employing a monetary
transfer scheme {ti (w)}i∈N . If the joint reported valuations (or messages) are
w = (w1 , ..., wn ) ∈ V , this scheme pays individual i ti (w) units of money.
3 The

terminology is taken from Green and Laﬀont [5].

4 The

notation “arg max” means the set of arguments that maximize the objective.

5A

suﬃcient condition would be: all vi ’s u.s.c. and D compact in a suitable topology.
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From now on, let us assume we have ﬁxed a particular eﬃcient decision
rule d∗ (·) satisfying (2) for all v ∈ V . A transfer scheme which induces each
individual to tell the truth as a dominant strategy (when the public decision
is made according to d∗ (·)) is called strongly individually incentive compatible
(s.i.i.c.). Truth will be a dominant strategy for all agents if and only if
vi ∈ arg maxvi (d∗ (wi , v i )) + ti (wi , v i ),
wi ∈Vi

∀i ∈ N.6

∀v ∈ V,

(3)

To see that condition (3) can be satisﬁed by a proper choice of ti ’s, observe
ﬁrst that (2) implies:

vj (d∗ (wi , v i )),
∀v ∈ V .
(4)
vi ∈ arg max
wi ∈Vi

j∈N

This simply says that truth-telling is socially optimal. Writing



ti (w) =
wj d∗ (w) + hi (w),
∀w ∈ V,
∀i ∈ N,

(5)

j∈N \{i}

as we may by choosing hi ’s appropriately, we can state (3) equivalently as:

vi (d∗ (wi , v i )) + hi (wi , v i ),
∀v ∈ V,
∀i ∈ N .
(6)
vi ∈ arg max
wi ∈Vi

j∈N

Compare (4) and (6). It is immediate that (6) is true whenever hi is independent of wi , since (4) holds by the deﬁnition of d∗ (·). By choosing the
transfer scheme {ti (w)}i∈N such that hi is independent of wi in (5), that is by
using a Groves’ scheme, the individual and social objective functions, expressed
in terms of messages, coincide. As a result, a Groves’ scheme is s.i.i.c., which
was ﬁrst proved in Groves and Loeb [8]. The reasoning given above, which uses
the fact that (2) implies (4), is a variant of the argument in Groves and Loeb
and illustrates quite clearly the rationale behind their result. It is also useful in
discussing the uniqueness question, which we now turn to.7

6 We use the notation xi
= (x1 , ..., xi−1 , xi+1 , ..., xn )
(x1 , ..., xi−1 , x
i , xi+1 , ..., xn ). Also, V i = ×j∈N \{i} Vj .

and

write

(
xi , xi )

=

7 It could be mentioned that if one assumes that the domains V are one-dimensional, so that
i
for any vi ∈ Vi , vi (d) = vi (d; xi ) for some parameter value xi ∈ R, then Groves’ scheme is easy
to derive (under suitable diﬀerentiability assumptions) from (4) and (6). One may let agents
report their parameter values instead of functions in this case. Let m = (m1 , ..., mn ) ∈ Rn
be their joint message. Then, if the respective derivatives exist, one gets from (4) and (6) as
ﬁrst-order conditions:

∂
∂
vi (d∗ (mi , xi ); xi ) +
ti (mi , xi ) = 0,
∂mi
∂mi
∂ 
vj (d∗ (mi , xi ); xj ) = 0,
at
∂mi j∈N

at

mi = xi ,

mi = xi .
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The question of when Groves’ scheme is the only scheme which is s.i.i.c. can,
by the previous discussion, be rephrased as follows: Under what conditions will
consistency of (4) and (6) imply that each hi has to be independent of wi ?
It is easy to see that generally consistency will not imply that hi is constant in
wi . For instance, if Vi ’s are taken to be discrete domains, easy counterexamples
can be given. Thus, a certain richness of the domains Vi is required. The
following deﬁnition will provide the appropriate condition of richness.
Deﬁnition 1. The domain V = ×i∈N Vi is said to be smoothly connected if for
any two valuation functions vi , vi ∈ Vi and any v i ∈ V i , there exists a one
dimensional parameterized family of valuation functions in Vi :
Vi (vi , vi ) = {vi (d; yi ) ∈ Vi | yi ∈ [0, 1]},
such that for all d ∈ D

∂vi (d; yi )
∂yi

vi (d; 0) = vi (d),

(i)

vi (d; 1) = vi (d),

(ii)

exists for all

yi ∈ [0, 1], 8

(iii)

and, moreover, for all yi ∈ [0, 1] and all d in D∗ (vi , vi ; v i ) = {d ∈ D | d =
d∗ (vi (d; yi ), v i ) for some yi ∈ [0, 1]}, we have


∂vi (d; yi )


for some
0 < K < ∞.
(iv)
 ∂yi  ≤ K
The set D∗ (vi , vi ; v i ) is the set of public decisions, which according to our
ﬁxed decision function d∗ (·) (satisfying (2)), maximize the social objective when
the valuation functions are (vi (d; yi ), v i ) for some yi ∈ [0, 1]. It is rather innocuous to assume that condition (iv) is satisﬁed in view of the restriction to
Combining these equations gives:
∂
∂
ti (mi , xi ) =
∂mi
∂mi



vj (d∗ (mi , xi ); xj ),

at

mi = xi .

j∈N \{i}

The unique solution is:
ti (x) =



vj (d∗ (x); xj ) + hi (xi ),

j∈N \{i}

i.e., Groves’ scheme.
This approach has been exhibited in more detail in Holmström [9]. Closely related approaches can be found in Laﬀont and Maskin [10] and Smets [11].
8 At

the endpoints yi = 0 or 1 only existence of one-sided derivatives is assumed.
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D∗ (vi , vi ; v i ), and it may well be that (iv) follows from (i)-(iii), but this question
is still open. Of course, if ∂vi (d; yi )/∂yi is continuous in both arguments that
will be the case.
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 1. If V is smoothly connected, any s.i.i.c. transfer scheme is a
Groves’ scheme.
Proof: Fix v i ∈ V i and let vi , vi ∈ Vi be arbitrary. If we can show that
hi (vi , v i ) = hi (vi , v i ) will follow from (4) and (6), the claim has been proved.
Consider the parameterized subdomain Vi (vi , vi ) in Deﬁnition 1. From (4)
and (6) follows:

 i )) + vi (d(m
 i ); yi ),
vj (d(m
(7)
yi ∈ arg max
mi ∈[0,1]

yi ∈ arg max
mi ∈[0,1]

j∈N \{i}



 i )) + vi (d(m
 i ); yi ) + 
vj (d(m
hi (mi ),

(8)

j∈N \{i}

where we have written:
 i ) ≡ d∗ (vi (d; mi ), v i ),
d(m

h(mi ) ≡ h∗ (vi (d; mi ), v i ).
By the lemma in Appendix A, (7) and (8) imply 
hi (0) = 
hi (1). Hence
i
 i

hi (vi , v ) = hi (vi , v ) using the deﬁnitions of hi (mi ) and vi (d; mi ).
Remark 1. It is self-evident from the proof that smooth connectedness could be
replaced by piecewise smooth connectedness; i.e., for any vi , vi ∈ Vi there would
(0) (1)
(k)
(0)
exist a sequence of valuation functions vi , vi , ..., vi ∈ Vi such that vi =
(k)
(t)
(t+1)
vi , vi = vi and each pair (vi , vi
)would would be smoothly connected.
Remark 2. In Appendix B an example is given which shows that uniqueness
may be lost if the domain is not smoothly connected. In the example condition
(iii) of Deﬁnition 1 is violated only at a single point for each d.
The primary example of a smoothly connected domain is a convex domain
as shown below. V is convex if v, v  ∈ V implies λv + (1 − λ)v  ∈ V for
all λ ∈ [0, 1]. (This should not be confused with the possible convexity of
preferences themselves, though, of course, all convex preferences constitute a
convex domain.)
Theorem 2. If V is a convex domain, then V is smoothly connected and any
s.i.i.c. transfer scheme is a Groves’ scheme.
Proof: Fix vi , vi ∈ Vi and v i ∈ V i . Let the functions
vi (d; yi ) = (1 − yi ) · vi (d) + yi · vi (d),

yi ∈ [0, 1],

(9)
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deﬁne the family Vi (vi , vi ) in Deﬁnition 1. By convexity this family is contained
in Vi and obviously it satisﬁes i, ii, and iii. In fact, ∂vi (d; yi )/∂yi = vi (d)−vi (d).
It remains to be shown that for some K > 0
|vi (d) − vi (d)| ≤ K

on D∗ (vi , vi ; v i ).

(10)

Make a contrapositive assumption that no K exists giving (10). Then there
∗
 i

exists a sequence {dk }∞
k=1 ⊂ D (vi , vi ; v ) such that either vi (dk )−vi (dk ) → −∞
or +∞. By symmetry it is enough to treat the former case.
Let yik be such that dk = d∗ (vi (d; yik ), v i ), and take d ∈ D such that for ∀k


vj (dk ) ≤
vj (d).9
(11)
j∈N

j∈N

By deﬁnition of dk and yik ,


vj (dk ) + yik · (vi (dk ) − vi (dk )) ≥
vj (d) + yik · (vi (d) − vi (d)),
j∈N

∀k. (12)

j∈N

Combining (11) and (12), we get
yik · (vi (dk ) − vi (dk )) ≥ yik · (vi (d) − vi (d)),

∀k.

(13)

Since we assumed vi (dk ) − vi (dk ) → −∞ and yik ∈ [0, 1], (13) must imply
the existence of a k0 > 0 such that yik = 0 for all k ≥ k0 . Hence, dk = dk+1 for
all k ≥ k0 , contradicting the assumption that vi (dk ) − vi (dk ) → −∞.
Examples of convex domains are the following:
1. Vi consists of all u.s.c. functions on D.
2. Vi consists of all continuous functions on D.
3. Vi consists of all strictly concave (or concave) functions on a convex subset
of Rt .
4. Vi consists of all concave quadratic utility functions on a convex subset of
Rt .
Thus Green and Laﬀont’s [5] uniqueness results (case 1 and 2) and Walker’s
uniqueness result (case 3) follow from Theorem 2. Case 4 corresponds to a
recent result by Green and Laﬀont [6], which is an improvement on Walker’s
result, since the domain in 4 is a subset of the domain in 3.
9 We

assumed earlier that D and V are such that a d satisfying (11) can be found.
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Concluding Remarks

We have shown that only a Groves’ scheme will be s.i.i.c. even when the domain of valuation functions is restricted, as long as this domain is smoothly
connected, for instance convex. For all practical purposes this result shows that
one has to be content with Groves’ scheme if s.i.i.c. is desired. Since Groves’
scheme possesses some undesirable properties, notably that the transfers need
not sum up to zero, the result is a negative one. Restricting agents’ admissible
valuation functions to a smaller domain does not usually lead to any new classes
of s.i.i.c. functions, which would possess some additional desirable features.
The methodology employed in this paper could also be used to study the
uniqueness question when the problem is formulated as a game of incomplete
information as was done originally in Groves [7]. Such a formulation would
be called for if agents could not fully communicate their preferences, but it
could also be used to weaken the notion of incentive compatibility and resolve
some of the negative conclusions about Groves’ scheme, as has been shown in
d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet [2].
In the context of a game of incomplete information the uniqueness result
states that any incentive compatible transfer scheme has to equal a Groves’
scheme in expectation (under appropriate independence assumptions). This was
proved ﬁrst by d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet [2, 3] for a somewhat restricted
model and has been generalized in Holmström [9].
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Appendix A
Denote I = [0, 1], I0 = (0, 1).
Lemma 1. Let f : I 2 → R and g: I → R satisfy:
(i) y ∈ arg maxf (m, y),
m∈I

(ii) y ∈ arg maxf (m, y) + g(m),
m∈I


for all
(iii) ∂f (m,y) ≤ K < ∞
∂y

m, y ∈ I.

Then g(m) = constant on I.
Proof: Deﬁne the functions:
η(y) = f (y, y),

η : I → R,

γ(y) = f (y, y) + g(y),

γ : I → R,

ϕ(y, m) = f (y, m) − f (m, m),

ϕ : I 2 → R,

π(y, m) = f (y, m) + g(y) − f (m, m) − g(m),

π : I 2 → R.

Step 1: η(y), γ(y), g(y) are Lipschitz on I. Take y, y  ∈ I arbitrary. Suppose
η(y) ≥ η(y  ). Then,
0

≤ η(y) − η(y  ) = f (y, y) − f (y, y  ) + f (y, y  ) − f (y  , y  )
≤ f (y, y) − f (y, y  ) ≤ K · |y − y  | .

The last two inequalities follow by (i) and (iii), respectively.
Arguing similarly if η(y) ≤ η(y  ), we get
|η(y) − η(y  )| ≤ K · |y − y  | .
Analogously, we can show
|γ(y) − γ(y  )| ≤ K · |y − y  | .
Since g(y) = γ(y) − η(y), the inequalities above imply
|g(y) − g(y  )| ≤ 2K · |y − y  | .
This establishes Step 1.
Step 2: Since η, γ, g are Lipschitz on I, they are a.e. diﬀerentiable on I. We
claim g  = 0 a.e. on I0 . By (i) and (ii) we have for any m, y ∈ I,
ϕ(y, m) ≤ 0,
π(y, m) ≤ 0.

(A.1)
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From the deﬁnitions,

and

f (y, m) − f (y, y) η(y) − η(m)
ϕ(y, m)
=
+
,
y−m
y−m
y−m

(A.2)

π(y, m)
f (y, m) − f (y, y) γ(y) − γ(m)
=
+
.
y−m
y−m
y−m

(A.3)

Letting y be a point where η  (y) and γ  (y) exist, it follows from (iii) that
the limits as m → y in (A.2) and (A.3) exist. Moreover, from (A.1) one gets
(by taking m ↓ y and m ↑ y):
lim

m→y

ϕ(y, m)
π(y, m)
= lim
= 0.
m→y y − m
y−m

Thus, for a.e. y ∈ I0 ,
lim

m→y

g(y) − g(m)
π(y, m) − ϕ(y, m)
= lim
= 0.
m→y
y−m
y−m

Step 3 : Since g  = 0 a.e. on I0 and g is Lipschitz on I, g(y) is a constant on
I.

Appendix B
We give an example for which schemes other than Groves’ are s.i.i.c.
Let n = 2, D = [0, 1], and deﬁne Vi ’s via the following parametric representations:

0,
if
d ≤ x1 ,
x1 ∈ [0, 1];
v1 (d; x1 ) =
d ≥ x1 ,
−(d − x1 ), if
1
x2 ∈ [0, 1].
v2 (d; x2 ) = x2 + d,
2
The maximizing d is equal to x1 , and hence is independent of x2 , though
this is not essential. The critical fact is that v1 (d; x1 ) does not have a partial
derivative with respect to x1 , at d = x1 , (though it has everywhere else), and
this leads to a kink in the social objective at d = x1 . It is readily checked
that the following transfer scheme is s.i.i.c. (we can take agents to report x1 , x2
rather than the functions themselves):
1
t1 (x) = g1 (x) + x1 ,
4
t2 (x) = g2 (x).
where (g1 , g2 ) is a Groves’ transfer scheme. Clearly, (t1 , t2 ) is not a Groves’
transfer scheme.
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